Sugared Philosophy: An Assessment of the Role Presentation Plays in the Works of Anselm and Aquinas Regarding the Existence and Attributes of God In light of Robert Nozick’s Conception of the Explanatory Function of Philosophical Arguments

by apologeistica

 

 

Abstract

It is my intention for this paper to discuss the writings of Anselm and Aquinas in light of Robert Nozick’s introduction to his Philosophical Explanations[1]. The conception of explanatory function in philosophical arguments outlined in Nozick’s work is apparent in the works of the Proslogion, Monolgion, and On Faith and Reason. This paper will attempt to illuminate just how this is the case.

  

  1. Introduction

 

Robert Nozick introduces the notion of philosophical argument when he questions how a good piece of philosophical writing entices its audience to adopt whatever conclusion the author is advancing. He notes that the piece of writing cannot be too overbearing in its approach as the audience will become defensive. The writing must not force its audience by way of argument, but instead must entice or convince the audience in a manner that is not offensive or results in a feeling of intrusion. Interestingly enough, Nozick notes that it is not the strength of the argument (that is, an argument can be perfectly sound) that accomplishes the greatest positive response, but instead the strength of an argument coupled with a style that renders the greatest possible element of persuasion. The best philosophical works entice an audience to entertain what the philosopher is contemplating.

 

It is due to this style of persuasive writing coupled with strong and clear argument that renders an audience useless to put up much of a fight in objection to what the philosopher has to offer. Nozick makes a point in noting that in the past he has been guilty of approaching a philosophical paper with the intention of finding the inconsistencies before he has even begun to read.[2] I must admit that I too am guilty of just such an approach to reading and assessing philosophy. I do not begin with an open mind and I gauge the strength of the philosopher’s work on his or her ability to overcome my defenses and leave me with an inability to reject what they have advanced in their respective works.

 

The work of Thomas Aquinas is an example of just such a philosopher. Upon reading his On Faith and Reason I found myself sitting on my front porch swing, sipping coffee, and  reading past the assigned sections only to be alarmed that I was going to be late for class. The strength of a philosophical work is found in what you do not realize that you are being convinced of. The reader merely follows the philosopher as he or she teases out the heavier concepts and offers their conclusion for consideration. If propositions begin being crammed down the reader’s neck, the work loses the element of persuasion and the audience loses their open mind. They end up spending too much effort finding a reason to reject the author’s work, and not enough time considering the argument’s strength.

 

A perfect example of just such an occurrence can be found in the work of Anselm. Fellow students (and I include myself in this) find his Ontological Argument difficult to accept. Yet (and here I am citing my own discussions with fellow students), it is very difficult to pinpoint precisely why it is that we have a desire to reject the argument as viable. To this day I cannot tell you exactly why I am somewhat bothered by the argument (and I already believe that God exists!). Could it be that what Nozick notes as the knockdown[3] argument is what could be the source of my rejection? Even though I do not know for certain, the point here is that there is most definitely a level of influence that stems directly from the author to the reader by way of the style and presentation. It is true that an argument’s strength is directly related to the propositions offered. However, an argument’s persuasiveness (I am convinced) is directly related to the way the argument is presented. If a spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go down, then why wouldn’t the same hold true for philosophical writing?

 

  1. Anselm’s Lack of Sugar

 

Anslem’s presentation regarding the attributes and existence of God is seriously lacking in the sugar department. I am not entirely sure this is a negative in his work, it may simply be due to a lack of desire to produce work that is anything more than the bare bones of an argument. Anselm’s concern is “faith seeking understanding” {MP II, xiii} which was, interestingly enough,  the initial title of the work he later renamed the Proslogion. This way of already accepting a conclusion as true and then reasoning to it, may explain why Anselm presents his arguments in the way he does. He carefully considers every step he makes in an argument. It is a very slow and tedious (and admittedly, sometimes I would be reading and wonder why he felt he needed to establish certain steps that seemed to me to be perfectly unquestionable) way of argument. Everything is fleshed-out to such a degree that there can be no counter-argument. All of the alternatives to a proposition he considers as the reader considers along with him. It is in this way that perhaps the difficulty in accepting his arguments is not due to the argument itself, but instead due to the argument forcing the conclusion. The Ontological Argument, for example, Anselm’s most famous contribution to the philosophical and theological realm, is so exquisitely simple that it is alarming. One reads and rereads the argument searching for a flaw, any flaw that would allow the reader space for objection. Perhaps now is a good time to take a look at the argument in a little more detail in order for me to demonstrate what I mean by this.

 

  1. The Ontological Argument

 

The Ontological Argument as presented in the Proslogion is, in reality, one of several proofs for God’s existence found within the work. Two separate, and preliminary proofs can be found in the Monologion alone. For example, in Monologion I, Anselm asks the question of whether or not all existing things exist through some one thing? His conclusion is that yes they do, and that one thing is in fact God:

 

[Phase I]

 

  1. Every entity exists either through something or through nothing.
  2. It is impossible that any entity does not exist through something. Therefore,
  3. Nothing exists through nothing. Therefore,
  4. Every entity exists through something.

 

[Phase II]

 

  1. Either (a) there is one thing, or (b) there are several things, through which all entities exist.
  2. If (b) there are several things through which all entities exist then either (i) they in turn exist through one thing, or (II) each of them exists through itself, or (iii) they exist through one another.
  3. If (i), then not-(b) but rather (a).
  4. If (ii), then they all exist through themselves in virtue of some one poser or nature of self-existing, which is tantamount to (a).
  5. Not-(iii), since entities cannot exist through one another reciprocally. Therefore,
  6. There is one thing through which all entities exist. Therefore,
  7. The one thing through which all entities exist exists only through himself. Therefore,
  8. All other entities exist through him.

QED[4]

Here we see Anselm’s consideration of every step. As a philosophy student assessing the argument presented (in light of having spent significant time considering) I continue to have a problem finding where a premise has been assumed or may be lacking in some area. The argument appears to me to have considered every alternative. For example, I could say that perhaps premise six is not anticipating a fourth option. But what else could there be? It seems to me that the three available options exhaust the possibilities for existence. Because I cannot provide the reader with an example of a fourth category, I am forced to accept that the options have been exhausted and thusly I am forced to accept the conclusion that there exists some one thing through which all other things exist {MP 3, p. 12-13}.

 

Anselm does not stop here. Remember that this section is devoted to the Ontological Argument- the above is merely a preliminary stage. The existence of God may have been established, but the attribute of the greatest possible being conceivable has yet to be established:

 

[Phase I]

  1. We can conceive of a being that which none greater can be thought (God).
  2. We understand the meaning of this description.
  3. To understand something is for it to exist in intellectu, though not necessarily in re. Therefore,
  4. The being that which none greater can be thought (God) exists in intellectu.

  

[Phase II]

  1. The being that which none greater can be thought (God) exists in re.
  2. Assume that 5 is false.
  3. What exists in intellectu can be conceived of existing in re.
  4. If the being that which none is greater can be thought (God) can be conceived of existing in intellectu, then he can be conceived of existing in re.
  5. Existing in re is greater than only existing in intellectu.
  6. If the being that which none greater can be thought only exists in intellectu, then it cannot be the greatest being that which none greater can be thought.
  7. Premise 10 is a contradiction. Therefore,
  8. Premise 6 is false. Therefore,
  9. Premise 5 is true.

QED[5]

Here again, Anselm assumes nothing (save for what is necessary for a reductio ad absurdum) leaving no room for the reader to object. It is truly a beautiful and simple piece of work. But in light of Nozick’s analysis of philosophical writing, Anselm necessarily opens his work to a substantially larger population to reject by virtue of his presentation.

 

Personally, I have a very difficult time saying that Anselm’s work possesses a negative air about it in this way. I have a preference for cold and hard premises that I cannot argue with. My nature is to necessitate that an argument be shoved down my throat simply because I will almost never embrace a new system of thought unless it is so thoroughly exhausted that I cannot deny its truth. I find that with Anselm, the rejection of his arguments by myself (and others) is due more so to pride than to anything else. It is a very humbling experience to be presented with a piece of work that is so well done and simple that one wonders why the argument has not been thought of before (or at the very least, how, if there is something wrong with the argument, it is still being entertained some hundreds of years later).[6]

 

All in all, whether or not one appreciates the simplicity of Anselm’s work is irrelevant to one’s acceptance of the strength of the argument. It is a sad fact that work such as this can inspire a negative reaction in an audience. Perhaps had Anselm anticipated his work being scrutinized by college students, he might have presented it in a little more considerate matter. Perhaps the manner that it was presented in is the most considerate as the argument does not presume that the reader will be convinced by niceties, but only by the strength of the premises. Either way, there is a reason why Anselm is still studied today and that fact alone renders his presentation of argument well done (even if it is a little hard to swallow).

 

  1. Aquinas’ Approach Easier to Swallow

 

In comparison to Anselm, the work of Thomas Aquinas is much more palatable with respect to the actual reading of the text. It is true that I am biased in my analysis of Aquinas, however I feel that I am justified in saying so considering the conversations that I have had with others who hold the same opinion as myself. I am unsure as to why this is the case except for perhaps the layout of the arguments differ, which may account for the difference in readings.

 

Both authors appeal to scripture as the basis for their work when convenient to do so. Aquinas is particularly good at appealing to scripture when necessary (as well as conveniently leaving scripture out of the picture when necessary) and it is because of this basis that I believe grants Aquinas the air of authority that becomes evident when reading his work. There is a certain pointed and unapologetic feel that comes through in the writing that is not as evident as in the work of Anselm.

 

In passing, I noted briefly that perhaps my ability to accept Aquinas with a little more ease than Anselm is due to the layout of argument. Simply stated, I prefer the way in which Aquinas decided to format his arguments.[7] Not only does he state the problem, but he also presents the many different responses one might have to the problem, followed by his own reply. He then anticipates objections to the specific position he advances. I think this may be perhaps why I am biased.[8] The clarity and anticipation of objections always impresses me. 

 

Another reason for my preference in his work (and why I would regard Aquinas as an example of what Nozick mentions as a type of author who can convince an audience without knocking them down) is that in regard to the nature and attributes of God, he embraces via negativa. I have had, in the past, a tendency to approach theology by way of negatives; designating what God is not, instead of what he is. Aquinas does the same thing. Perhaps it is this approach to the study of God that grants Aquinas’ work a level of humility that the reader is sensitive to. This may explain why the Cosmological Argument advanced in On Faith and Reason is more readily accepted by the masses (or, at the very least, the folks I have had the privilege of speaking with). This is certainly not to take away from the authoritative undertones that one experiences in reading Aquinas, but merely to point out that such an approach to the study of God openly acknowledges the nature of human finitude and adjusts accordingly. Deciphering what God cannot be seems to be within human limitations. Defining what God is may not be.

 

  1. The Cosmological Argument

 

Aquinas offers his own argument for God’s existence with a slightly different approach than that of Anselm. Although both offer very strong arguments, again in light of Nozick’s illumination of how an argument is presented, Aquinas outlines his argument in a slightly different way. Essentially what he does is construct what can be distinguished as three separate ways of proving God’s existence, and he does so without appealing to scripture. Allow me to demonstrate the first of the three below:

 

[Phase I] 

  1. Some things change.
  2. Everything that changes is changed by another thing.[9]
  3. If another thing changes, it must be changed by yet another thing. Therefore,
  4. And so on, and so forth.

 

[Phase II] 

  1. If something changes it must be changed by another thing.
  2. An infinite regression of causes is illogical.
  3. Assume 6 is false. Therefore,
  4. There is no first cause. Therefore,
  5. There are no intermediate causes.

      10. (Premise 9 is contradictory with 1) Therefore,

  1. Premise 6 is not false. Therefore,
  2. There is a first cause (God).  

QED[10]                                   

Here we find what appears to be exactly the same kind of work (or at least, of the same tradition as Anselm). I would agree that it seems here that Aquinas is not much different from his predecessor by way of argument (with the obvious exception being the content). However, in spite of my having formatted their arguments in relatively the same manner, if the reader were to compare the writing styles of these two men, they would find that they are decidedly dissimilar.

 

While writing this paper it occurred to me that the reason that Aquinas is more acceptable in comparison to Anselm to me may be do to the politeness of presentation as well as form. For example, Aquinas begins his articles by raising an objection and then responding to it. But upon raising the objection (something he anticipates the reader to be thinking as a possibility) he remarks, “It would seem….” {OFR VII, 1 p. 96}. I say “politeness” because what he does there is entertain the idea that it is very likely and seems plausible to consider so and so objection. Even though he goes on to prove the objection false, he grants the reader consideration, granting them a level of credence that Anselm did not. It is almost as though when one is reading Aquinas, he or she is having a conversation. The philosopher and reader are on equal terms and carrying on a friendly conversation. With Anselm this was not the case. The relationship between Anselm and the reader was distant and less engaging. In his analysis it is almost as if the reader is standing by and watching Anselm work. He is not really interested in anyone else’s thoughts but his own and so his work comes across as less appealing. With Aquinas, significant amount of time is placed in anticipating how others might react to what he is advancing. This allows for the development of alternative ideas and renders his work more convincing perhaps.

 

  1. Concluding Remarks

 

The time and effort placed in the work of Anselm and Aquinas is astounding. If one can look past the respective presentations of these men and base the strength of their arguments purely upon the validity of the premises, it is my opinion that they would both come out equal. However, as is evident in Nozick’s introduction to his Philosophical Concepts, that is, regrettably, not the only aspect of argument that is considered. Form and ease of acceptance is found in the argument’s persuasiveness coupled with the strength of its premises. With respect to both philosophers, I can appreciate both arguments for what they have to offer. Perhaps a less cut and dry form of argumentation renders a sweeter and more readily acceptable argument. Perhaps the reader needs to develop a taste for the sour. Either way, both philosophers advance proofs for God’s existence that deserve careful consideration.

  

Bibliography

 

  1. Williams, Thomas. Monologion and Proslogion: with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm. Indianaplis, MD./Cambridge UK: Hackett Publishing Co, Inc. , 1995. {MP}
  2. Brown, Stephen F.. Aquinas: On Faith and Reason. Indianaplis, MD./Cambridge UK: Hackett Publishing Co, Inc. , 1999.

{OFR}

  1. Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

[1] Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

[2] Coercive philosophy section.

[3] Nozick p. 4.

[4] J. Palmer Handout of Monologion 1. (Formatting mine).

[5] J. Palmer Handout. (Formatting Mine).

[6] I realize that there are (and have been) objections to this argument throughout history. Our class raised some objections to specific premises, however there is always a failure in objection to be able to come up with adequate enough counter-examples to prove the premises undoubtedly false. Perhaps one exists, but as of yet I have not been given one.

[7] As well as, I am sure, Stephen Brown’s editing.

[8] That or my bias is due to the fact that I have been faced, up until this point, with Boethius and Ockham’s way of presenting an argument. Perhaps the ease of reading with Aquinas in comparison to these two men only made me lazy. Oh well, Aquinas still wins in my humble opinion.

[9] Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur- here he presents a subsidiary argument for this premise, but because this was not elaborated upon (and need not be for sake of this paper), I have excluded it.

[10] J. Palmer Handout (Formatting mine). 

 

In Him as always,

A.R. 

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